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Abstract
Safety analysis is an important method of compliance demonstration for airworthiness regulation. In this paper, the 
application of Markov analysis in system safety assessment is studied, and the common method of Markov analysis 
for system safety assessment is given. A failure state of flight control system is modeled and analyzed by Markov 
analysis and fault tree analysis respectively, and the results show that Markov method has a higher accuracy of 
quantitative analysis of the sequence related events. This method also overcomes the shortcomings of the static 
analysis features of the fault tree analysis.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid development of international civil aviation transport industry, the safety of civil 
aviation system has become a problem which is paid close attention by people. National civil aviation 
authorities have developed the special airworthiness standards to ensure the safety of civil aircraft design, 
in which transport aircraft airworthiness standards section 1309 (CCAR/FAR25.1309) provides for the 
safety indicators of aircraft and system and the general requirements of safety assessment[1]. System 
safety analysis process is an important means of ensuring aircraft design to meet the safety requirements 
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of airworthiness standards. Generally, system safety assessment process includes Functional Hazard 
Analysis (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and System Safety Assessment (SSA)[2]. 
The more common system safety analysis methods include failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), 
fault tree analysis (FTA), dependence diagram (DD) and so on[3].
Currently, FTA and DD are both widely used as safety analysis method, which are based on a simple 
technical concept and easy to understand. But the FTA and the DD methods have its own limitations[2]: 
Firstly, the top event of fault tree can only be a single failure event, so the analysis of the system need to
spend a lot of energy; Secondly, the ability of describing different types of fault tree is limited, so it is 
difficult to establish the fault tree for some systems, such as repair systems; Thirdly, only when the 
equipment under the assumption of independent or mutually exclusive, FTA and DD methods can be 
greatly simplified during the calculation, etc. This article will introduce Markov Analysis (MA) into the 
process of safety analysis, which not only overcomes the shortcomings of static analysis features of FTA, 
but also improves the calculation accuracy in a certain extent.
2. Basic Theory Of Markov Analysis
The general steps for analyzing the system failure rate using of Markov process are [2][4][5]:
(1) Observe the operating state of the system, analysis the composition units of the system; (2) Define 
the various states of the units accurately, and determine the transfer relationship between the states, then 
draw the state transition diagram; (3) Write down the equations which are about the relationship between 
the system conversion and the system state according to the state transition diagram of the system; (4) 
Solve the state equations based on the constant failure rate and initial conditions; (5) Obtain the system 
failure probability according to the relationship between the system failure and the unit failure.
In general, the change in the probability of a state is due to the flows leaving and entering that state. 
The flows along a transition are the product of the transition rate along that transition and the probability 
of the state at the origin of that transition. A negative sign represents the rate at which the system is 
leaving that particular state, while a positive sign implies the rate at which the system is entering that new 
state.
Taking the following state transition diagram for example, see Fig 1.
In this system, state S3 has a time dependent probability value of ( )tp3 . It has two input arcs from
states S1and S2 and one output arc to state S4. Time dependent probability values of S1and S2
are ( )tp1 and ( )tp2 respectively. Transition rates into the state S3 from S1and S2 are 1λ and 2λ respectively. 
Transition rate out of the state is 3λ . Then, the rate of change of the status probability of S3 can be given
by the following equation:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tptptp
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tdp
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Fig.1. an example of input/output transitions in/out of a state in a Markov chain
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Similarly, differential equations can be written for all other states of this Markov chain. Then the 
system failure probability can be obtained according to (4) and (5).
3. Safety Analysis Of Flight Control System
Flight control system control the roll, yaw and pitch[5]. It also control the lift and drag of the wing 
during taking off or landing and speed brake in air and ground lift dump on ground. Flight control system 
consists of the primary flight control system (PFCS) and the high lift control system (HLCF). The PFCS
takes the conventional control, position sensing and the main channel (analog line) for signal processing 
and transmission. PFCS is a system of electro-hydraulic servo-actuated, which handles the atmosphere 
and the attitude signals and also digital control augmentation and parameter adjustment by the flight 
control computer. The PFCS provides control, monitoring and unit alarm function for the elevator (left 
and right), rudder, aileron (left and right), multi-function spoiler (3 pairs), the ground spoilers (1 pair) and 
the horizontal stabilizer subsystem. The control of aircraft pitch axis is achieved by the horizontal 
stabilizer and the elevator[6]. The pitch trim is achieved by the horizontal stabilizer and the pitch control 
is achieved by the elevator.
The "actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating" is a fault dangerous state, 
which is identified in FHA of the flight control system[8]. If the fault state happens, it would lead to the
stabilizer Free-floating, and bring not controllable pitch trim moment to the aircraft, then the aircraft 
would lost of control. Therefore the fault state is catastrophic, the happening probability of it must be less
than 1e-9 per flight hour. There are two reasons that can lead to "the actuator load-channel failure 
resulting controlpiston free-floating", including “Main load channel failure” and “Second load channel
failure”. And only when the “Main load channel failure” occurs firstly, "the actuator load-channel failure 
resulting controlpiston free-floating" will occur. The MA and FTA methods are used to model and 
analysis this failure state as follows.
In the following analysis, A and B represent the “Main load channel failure” and “Second load channel
failure” respectively. 1λ and 2λ represent the failure rate of the two reason events, while 1µ and 2µ represent 
the repair rate of the two reason events.
3.1. Markov modeling and analysis
The Markov state transition diagram of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-
floating" is shown in Fig 2.
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Fig.2 the state transition diagram of " the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating"
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In Fig 2, the binary group in the ellipse is represent of state of the component units of the system. And
zero represents ‘the unit work’, one represents ‘the unit fail’. Such as (0 1) indicates that the system unit A 
is normal and unit B is failure. The ( )tpi is the probability of being in state i at time t in the following
equations. The state equations of the system represented in Fig 2 are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tptptptptp
dt
tdp
54213221121
1 ++++++−= µµµµλλ                                                              (1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tptp
dt
tdp
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2 µλλ +−=                                                                                                     (2)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tptp
dt
tdp
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3 µλλ +−=                                                                                                    (3)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tptp
dt
tdp
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tptp
dt
tdp
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For constant failure rate and an initial condition of ( ) [ ]000010 =p , the state equations can be 
integrated to obtain the expressions for all the probability values. We can get the failure rate of "the 
actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating" as follows:
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
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3.2. Fault tree modeling and analysis
Establish the fault tree with the top event of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston 
free-floating", which is shown in Fig 3.
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Fig.3. the fault tree with the top event of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating"
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Ap and Bp represent the happen probability of A and B respectively. And, 
( )[ ]ttp A 11
11
1 exp1 µλ
µλ
λ
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+
= , ( )[ ]ttpB 22
22
2 exp1 µλ
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−−−
+
= . 
When 021 == µµ , the failure rate of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-
floating" is:
( )[ ] ( )[ ]ttp 212 exp1exp12
1
λλ −−×−−=                                                                                                   (7)
3.3. Comparing the analysis results of Markov and FT
According to experience we can obtain the general values of 1λ and 2λ . Here we can get
752.71 −= eλ and 7902.32 −= eλ .The values of 1λ and 2λ are substituted into the formula (6) and (7), then use 
MATLAB to simulate and analyze. The changing of the happening probability of "the actuator load-
channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating" with time is plotted, which is shown in Fig 4. If the 
time parameter is 20 hours and 7902.32 −= eλ , the changing of the happening probability of "the actuator 
load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating" with 1λ can be plotted, which is shown in Fig 5.
                       
Fig.4. the changing of the happening probability of the top event with time; Fig. 5. the changing of the happening probability of the 
top event with 1λ
In the Fig 4 and Fig 5, the curve P2 is the results of FTA and the curve P1 is the results of MA. Fig 4 
shows that the failure rate value of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting controlpiston free-floating"
obtained by FTA is larger than that is obtained by MA, that is to say, MA method is more accurate than 
the FTA method when safety analysis is conducted to such failures of flight control system. Fig 5 shows 
that the requirement of the failure rate of A is lower by MA than that is by FTA when the conditions of 
system safety assessment are satisfied (the failure rate of "the actuator load-channel failure resulting 
controlpiston free-floating" is less than 1e-9 per flight hour)and other performance parameters unchanged. 
This result indicates that people can reduce the existing flight control system performance requirements of 
some parts of the high technical standards to reduce unnecessary waste of resources when the design 
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performance indicators of the system are assured. This conclusion has a certain theoretical and practical 
significance to the safety assessment of flight control system.
4. Conclusions
Markov model is a powerful tool of solving the probability of the hazard state of the system. In this 
paper, there have established the transition diagrams and state transition equations of a specific fault event 
using Markov model, and the probability of the hazard state is obtained by solving the differential 
equations, and also the same failure state is modeled and analyzed by fault tree method. By comparing the 
analysis results of the two methods, it shows that the Markov method not only overcome the shortcomings 
of static analysis feature of the FTA, but also has a higher accuracy than the traditional method in the 
analysis of the sequence related events. This conclusion is significant to safety assessment, rational design 
and the aspect of evaluating the cost-effective of the flight control system.
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